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Abstract
The discussion of the sovereign is a discourse of legal limits — the 
boundary between law and non-law. Steering clear from providing an 
abstract definition, Carl Schmitt bases his discussion on the concrete 
application of the sovereign. This short article considers the viability of 
Schmitt’s theory and his attempt to “secularise theological concepts” by 
exploring  three  aspects  of  the  theory:  the  pouvoir  constituant,  the 
“dialogue” between the nation and the sovereign, and the “decision” of 
the sovereign.  The paper concludes that Schmitt’s sovereign does not 
convincingly  overcome  the  inherent  dissonance  between  the 
transcendental and the temporal. 
 
I: INTRODUCTION
The discussion of the sovereign is a discourse of legal limits. Being at the “outermost 
sphere” (Schmitt 1985, 5) of legal power, the sovereign (if he indeed exists) occupies 
the  boundary  between  law  and  non-law.  For  Carl  Schmitt,  this  is  not  merely  an 
objective position, but also one with a practical relevance. Since “[a]ll significant 
concepts  of  the  modern  theory  of  the  state  are  secularized  theological 
concepts” (Schmitt 1985, 36), Schmitt has to cope with the dialectics and paradoxes 
common to theological discourse. While the theologian may well attribute abstract 
conceptions to the omnipotent God, Schmitt’s secularised version purports to go a 
step further by grounding his conception on a “concrete application”. 
II: SCHMITT’S THEORY: AN OVERVIEW
At the heart of Schmitt’s theory lies his unique approach to dialectics, best 
expressed in the words he quotes from Kierkegaard: “[t]he exception explains the 
general and itself” (Schmitt 1985, 15). Thus, Schmitt (1985, 5) famously declared that 
the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. For him, dictatorship is a “state of 
exception” — a transitional, exceptional suspension of the norms of the state. In the 
exception, there arises the possibility of a contradiction between “governance” and 
“actualisation”;  between  “norms”  and  “decisions”. A  distinction  is  made  between 
“commissarial  dictatorship”  and  “sovereign  dictatorship”,  the  latter  being  the 
description of the sovereign’s decision in the state of exception. The “fusion” between 
the two is effected by the pouvoir constituant — the constituting power of the people. 
In identifying himself with the Hobbseian “natural law of science” tradition, Schmitt 
is not concerned about the content of decisions, but with the fact that a decision is taken at all.
III: CRITIQUE
In answering the difficult question “What is sovereignty?”, Schmitt (1985, 6) 
states that “it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme advanced to define 
sovereignty…is acceptable…What is argued about is the concrete application”. As 
such, the viability of his theory must ultimately be measured against the extent to 
which the conception is of concrete relevance. 
a) The pouvoir constituant and the unity of the “nation”
The pouvoir constituant is that which allows the sovereign to remain “legal” 
in the state of exception. Since it is itself non-constituted, it crucially remains the 
justificatory power even when the entire existing constitution is suspended. From a 
theoretical  point  of  view,  the  omnipotence  of  the  pouvoir  constituant  plays  the 
theological role of the “objectively unclear” God (Schmitt 1994, 140): it acts as the 
extra-legal  power  which  justifies  the  legal  power  of  the  sovereign.  This  is 
conceptually attractive in that it provides a rational, comprehendible substitute for the 
non-constituted, constituting authority of God.
However, doubts arise as to the success of Schmitt’s attempt to translate this 
secularised concept into concrete actuality. The concept finds its root in Rousseau’s 
“volonté générale” — the will of the state. In Verfassungslehre, Schmitt (1928, 79) 
refines this will as emanating from the “nation” — “the people as a unity capable of 
political action” (emphasis added). Compare this perceived “unity” with any concrete 
populace. A nation is made up of individuals. The question, then, is whether there 
exists a concrete, normatively neutral common denominator which in fact unites the 
individual wills of the people. Now, one might think that Rousseau’s concept of the 
vertu provides this common denominator, since it prevails even where the true will of 
the majority is suppressed by egoistic affects (Schmitt 1994, 120). However, it seems 
that Schmitt saw the vertu only as a justification to his concept of sovereignty, since 
dictatorship corrects the disunity of vertu — that is, “to help the egoist, who is not 
free, to find his true will” (Schmitt 1994, 121). It would be contradictory if the unity 
of the vertu were taken as both the aim and the source of the sovereign’s power. 
It appears that Schmitt simply takes “the relative homogeneity of the people” 
as “factually given” (Böckenförde 1986, 42). However, without demonstrating what 
actually  unites  the  individual  wills  of  the  people,  he  seems  to  have  merely 
hypostasised the abstract idea of “the general will”, in order to claim the concrete 
relevance of the sovereign. If Schmitt (1994, 134) only “assume[s] the existence of a 
power” (emphasis added) — i.e. the pouvoir constituant, then he only goes so far as 
to show that such a justifying power ought to exist, and ought to justify the sovereign; 
he does not yet show the concrete “is”-fact from which this justification emanates. If 
this criticism holds true, then Schmitt’s conception does not really explain “[h]ow…a 
legal order [is] possible in the first place” (Delacroix 2005, 32) — he does not go further than Kelsen did. Indeed, both jurists presuppose a unity; the difference being 
only that Kelsen’s unity applies to the entire legal order, whereas Schmitt’s applies to 
the pouvoir constituant. But while Kelsen is up-front about the fact that this unity is a 
presupposition, Schmitt seems to have hidden it behind the hypostasis that such a 
unity does in fact exist. Indeed, by assuming the unity of will, the pouvoir constituant 
fails to break free from one of the tropes of Agrippa’s Trilemma.
b) The dialogue between the nation and the sovereign
To ground the concept in concrete actuality, Schmitt builds his theory upon 
Sieyès’ notion of “permissibility of representation”. At the core of this idea lies an 
interesting two-way “dialogue” between the “nation” and the sovereign. On the one 
hand, the nation “permits” the sovereign to exercise the general will. On the other 
hand, the sovereign “represents” the people.
As opposed to a holder of a mandate “who merely communicate[s] an already 
established  will”,  the  sovereign  is  a  representative  who  is  to  ““form”  this  will” 
himself (Schmitt 1994, 140). Indeed, it may be that “a will of the people in terms of 
content is inexistent, and has to be formed by the representatives” (Schmitt 1994, 
140). This  relates  to  the  content/decision  dichotomy:  the  sovereign  represents  the 
“nation” in deciding on the content of the will, being justified in doing so by the 
pouvoir constituant. However, the question necessarily arises again as to whether a 
united “will of the people” exists. In addition, it must also be questioned whether the 
constitutive element of the “will of the people” (if this is indeed plausible) can exist 
without content; and further, whether that constitutive element constantly remains as a 
unity regardless of the fact that many (sometimes, even a majority) of the individual 
wills will have contents which significantly differ from that formed by the sovereign. 
This is crucial in the pluralistic modern society: it is one thing to relegate pluralism to 
being  merely  content-specific  (as  distinct  from  its  “constituting  element”);  it  is 
another thing to say that this general constituting will remains a unity even when the 
content  of  the  will  formed  by  the  sovereign  is  tangential  to  the  contents  of  the 
individual wills of the people. 
The “permissibility” limb is postulated in contradistinction to a mandate, and 
hence it does not depend on a referendum. This is clear from the way Schmitt rejects 
Rousseau’s use of the referendum to compare the “legislator’s designs” against the 
“volonté  générale”,  which  for  Schmitt  (1994,  126)  might  present  the  inexplicable 
situation of a negative referendum: a going “against the law and the great soul”. It is 
also necessary for Schmitt to reject the use of the referendum to avoid making “the 
people” an organ of the constitution in order to maintain the continuing relevance of 
the pouvoir constituant even in the absence of a normative order. However, Schmitt 
(1994, 141–142) does not then explain how this permissibility comes about, for he 
only  mentions  it  in  passing.  This  is  surprising,  since  there  surely  must  be  a 
“permission” before the sovereign can “represent”. In other words, “permissibility” is 
prior  in  relevance  and  importance  to  “representation”  in  the  logical  sequence  of 
analysis. Without a referendum, the only alternative is for there to exist a concrete unity  of  will  —  one  that  binds  every  individual  —  so  that  it  matters  not  which 
individual  (or  body  of  individuals)  acts  as  the  sovereign,  since  anybody  would 
properly be permitted to act by everyone else. Unfortunately, as discussed above, this 
unity seems to be a mere fictitious presupposition. Hence, the criticism is made that 
the sovereign’s decision “lacks an ethical moment” (Delacroix 2005, 31).
In  counterargument,  it  could  be  said  that  the  “permissibility”  given  to  the 
sovereign in the state of exception derives not from the old constitution but from the 
future constitution. This idea that the sovereign “remains in functional dependence 
from an…imagined constitution” (Schmitt 1994, 146) runs like a thread throughout 
Schmitt’s work. However, it appears to engage a retrospective fallacy. The doubt here 
concerns not the sovereign’s actions, but the retrospective attribution of legality to it 
— a legality which is lacking at the very moment the sovereign makes his decision. 
Only with the benefit of hindsight can one properly claim that (to paraphrase Schmitt 
1994, 133) “the negation of the immediately present state of affairs did allow for a 
more precise determination of the future state of affairs.” Indeed, one must wait for 
the new normative order to be in place before one can tell if a particular state of 
affairs  was  an  “exceptional  transition”  and  not  an  “absolute  monarchy”  or  a 
“sovereign  aristocracy”.  This  clearly  reveals  the  fallacy  in  incorporating  the 
“timelessness” of the omnipotent God into a time-bound secularised theory where 
time travels in a linear fashion. 
c) The decision and the discourse of the limits
It seems to accord well with our instincts to say that what is “legal” is a norm; 
and  thus  when  the  normative  order  ceases  to  exist  then  what  remains  must  be 
something “extra-legal”. Indeed, many great jurists construct their theories upon this 
very  premise.  Schmitt,  however,  takes  a  unique  approach:  for  him,  a  legal  order 
consists of two distinct elements — “norm” and “decision”. Since a legal idea (that is, 
a norm) “in its purity can never become reality”, it requires a decision to make the 
norm concrete; and a decision cannot be derived from the legal idea or normative 
legal  order  (Schmitt  1985,  30).  The  distinctness  of  “norm”  and  “decision”  is 
indubitable; but Schmitt (1985, 13) goes further by claiming that the decision “reveals 
a specifically juristic element…in absolute purity” in the exception. However, this last 
claim  may  be  one  too  hastily  made  in  his  exposition.  Granted  that  whatever  we 
recognise as concretely “legal” may not consist exclusively of a norm; it still does not 
follow that the non-normative constituents may independently be “legal”. In other 
words, a decision may be necessary for a concrete legal order to exist, but it does not 
follow that the decision is itself sufficient for it. 
To emphasise the idea that “norm” and “decision” are irreducible elements, 
Schmitt (1985, 31–32) states that, “[l]ooked at normatively, the decision emanates 
from nothingness” (emphasis added). But Schmitt takes the decision to mean much 
more than “a non-norm”. Delacroix (2005, 39-40) points out that “in überdie drei 
Arten, the decision is characterised as an “absolute beginning””. The elevation of the 
decision  to  this  God-like  position  necessarily  relegates  the  pouvoir  constituant  to being at most a quasi-justification; since if it did in fact justify (in the full sense) the 
decision of the sovereign, then “the people” (and not the sovereign) would be the true 
“absolute beginning”. 
What then does this absolute “point of ascription” rest upon? Derrida (1992, 
14)  suggests  that  a  terminal  point  in  legal  analysis  “can’t  by  definition  rest  on 
anything but [itself]…[It is] neither legal nor illegal in [its] founding moment.” This 
uncomfortable compromise reveals the difficulty in defining the limits of law as being 
occupied by a secular being or action. From a more optimistic point of view however, 
it could be said that, only if such an irresolvable dichotomy emerges can we say that 
we have reached the concrete apex within a secularised theory. But it surely does not 
preclude the possibility that there lies beyond it a transcendental being whose absolute 
being is the ultimate apex of legality. To use the terminology of Arendt (1998, 177 fn 
3), who draws from the work of Augustine, the sovereign’s decision could well be the 
initium — “the beginning which is a man…inserted within the continuum of time”; 
but it certainly is not the principium — “the absolute beginning…that can only be the 
work of God” (discussed in Delacroix 2005, 40 fn 25).
A final issue must be addressed. The subject-matter the “absolute beginning” 
is clearly “the new normative order — the future constitution.” Yet, the relationship 
between the decision and the new constitution is an uneasy one; and this has very 
much  to  do  with  the  realm  of  time  and  space  within  which  the  secular  operates. 
Schmitt clearly saw the decision as being “before” the new legal order, in the sense 
that it was “prior” to it. But this seems to ignore the need for the sovereign as well as 
his decision to be “in front of” the new legal order. As Davies (1996, 70—71) writes: 
“this linear positivist chronology in which pre-existing human beings create a legal 
system…neglects the various ways in which subjects appear after or in front of the 
law  as  its  constructions”.  The  same  goes  for  Schmitt:  how  can  the  sovereign’s 
“absolute” decision create a legal order which must recognise that decision itself as 
legal? Indeed, how can the people of the “nation” — which, as the constituting power, 
must  by  definition  be  extra-legal  and  not  norm-bound  —  be  subject  to  the  new 
normative  order?  One  might  attempt  to  resolve  the  matter  by  drawing  upon  the 
theological concept of the revelation to say that the sovereign and the “nation” may 
reveal themselves to the new normative order, since they “could not be known apart 
from the unveiling” (Goswiller 1987, 3). Indeed, Schmitt (1994, 134) writes that “it is 
conceivable  that  the  holder  of  state  power  puts  himself  into  a  dependence…from 
which he makes himself dependent, becoming constituted sovereign and without…
cancelling all earthly power” (emphasis added). But yet again, a lacuna appears: for 
although the concept of the revelation may explain the transition between the state of 
exception and the new constitution — i.e. the subjecting of the decision to the new 
normative order — it nonetheless fails to explain why the sovereign and the people 
are necessarily bound by those norms, since any individual could opt out of the legal 
system on this view. It would seem that, unlike God, human beings and their actions 
in the secular realm are only confined to one or the other: either they are within the 
legal order, or they are without.IV: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, by shifting the focus away from the “comfortable superficiality” of 
the general to an inquiry based on the exception, Schmitt’s theory undoubtedly opens 
up jurisprudential thought to novel approaches in defining the sovereign and the limits 
of law. Many of the conceptual “landmarks” of his theory — such as the distinction 
between norm and decision, and the purported secularisation of theological concepts 
— raise interesting and unique questions. However, as Delacroix (2005, 44) observes, 
“[t]he interest of Schmitt’s theory…lies more in the issue it raises than in the answer it 
tries  to  provide.”  The  crux  of  the  problem,  it  seems,  is  the  inherent  dissonance 
between the transcendental and the temporal — the contradiction that exists when the 
attempt is made to “secularise theological concepts”. In the words of the theologian 
Charles Spurgeon, ““the proper study of mankind is man”…but…it is equally true 
that the proper study of God’s elect is God” (quoted in Packer 1993, 17). Without an 
omnipotent God, Schmitt’s attempt appears to fall short of overcoming the dialectics; 
and as such it does not provide a viable concrete account of the sovereign. However, 
if Schmitt’s work is viewed not as the search for the ultimate legal limits but an 
attempt to discover the best possible theory within the confines of the secular, then 
perhaps his theory can be said to be viable.References
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